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ABSTRACT 
Phenomenology and empirical research are not naturally compatible and devising an empirical 
technique aiming at researching experience is a challenge. This article presents second-person in-
depth phenomenological inquiry – a technique that tries to meet this challenge by allowing the 
transformation of a participant greatly interested in the investigation of their own subjective 
experience, into a co-researcher. It then provides an example of this technique being used in a study 
on enaction of beliefs, more closely showing the cooperative research process of researcher and co-
researcher and its result: a grounded theory. The article ends with a discussion on the techniques 
strengths and weaknesses. 
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INTRODUCTION 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHENOMENOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH, 
SOME PROBLEMS AND ATTEMPTS AT SOLUTIONS 
Husserl developed phenomenology, because he wanted to set science on a solid foundation. 
He believed that the natural sciences (among which he also counted psychology and other 
sciences of the mind) is naïve towards its own axioms and presuppositions: reality is simply 
assumed to exist out there, waiting to be explored and described [1]. 
He saw phenomenology as a transcendental science that is supposed to investigate the basis 
of knowledge and how it is possible. The naïveté of natural science should be overcome by 
systematic questioning of the presuppositions that natural science takes for granted. Among 
which, treating the mind as part of a natural world is the one that is the most interesting for 
cognitive science. Husserl shows that experiencing is our primary condition and makes a 
stand for treating it this way. For that he develops a methodological system that, instead of 
our “natural” attitude, takes hold of a phenomenological attitude and grounds itself in 
bracketing our everyday, i.e. “natural” attitude [1]. That is why “the phenomenological 
attitude has frequently been described as an unnatural direction of thought.” [2; p.338] 
Along with natural science’s basic presuppositions, Husserl [1] also rejects its 
methodological approaches. He describes his project of research as a philosophical one and 
does not see reconciliation as possible (except for the possibility of science accepting 
phenomenology as the primary discipline, upon which all other disciplines are based). 
According to Zahavi, Husserl viewed suggestions that the phenomenological account could 
be absorbed, or reduced, or replaced by a naturalistic account, as “sheer nonsense” [2; p.334]. 
Despite such a harsh delineation, the need to include a first-person (experiential) account is 
evident ever since the birth of cognitive science as an interdisciplinary approach devoted to 
studying the mind. This has introduced an abundance of different methods for studying 
experience. Some of these are quantitative (e.g. [3, 4]) while other methods are qualitative 
(e.g. [5-8]) and specially designed for the research of experience.  Disregarding Husserl’s 
desire for avoiding the empirical, many of these methods (especially the qualitative ones) 
nevertheless follow basic phenomenological guidelines (like the attempt to bracket 
presuppositions about the nature of experience etc.). 
Francisco Varela, one of the most vocal proponents of bridging the gap between the third- 
and first-person oriented approaches in cognitive science, points out that the study of 
experience needs to measure up to the standards of natural science – chief among them being 
replicability and intersubjectivity [9]. 
It would seem, that the very problem of many of the existing methods that the drive to 
achieve these standards steamrollers some of the essential characteristics of experience. 
“- Experience is simultaneously the framework of our observation, the observing eye, and the 
object of observation. 
  - By researching it, experience changes. 
  - The change in experience in turn changes the observer and therefore the observation. 
  - The above circularity is not a → b, b → a; it is a → a – experience observing experience. 
  - Our current experience is a point in the history of experience, which is constructing itself. 
  - Acquiring knowledge about experience is not so much about creating a categorical system 
as about expanding awareness to reach ever more subtle skills of bracketing the natural 
attitude and enhancing meta-experience (the experience of experience). 
  - Knowledge about experience is itself a new experience [...]” [10; p.380]. 
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An empirical approach to studying phenomenology should therefore, in accordance with the 
above characteristics, satisfy three conditions: 
1) Accept the constructive nature of observation and do away with idea of independence of 
observation and the observed. 
2) Intersubjective validation should not be a necessary condition for studying experience. 
This does not mean that studying experience cannot produce intersubjectively not 
valatable and/or replicable results, but results should not be dismissed solely on those 
grounds. Hope remains that the study of experience will someday unveil invariants, but 
this hope should not be valued more than the data available to us. 
3) Accept the possibility that research changes the researcher. [10] 
Some of these challenges are already addressed by an interview method called the elicitation 
interview. The method was conceived by P. Vermersch [11] and its most prominent 
representative is C. Petitmengin, who provides a thorough description of the elicitation 
interview in her 2006 article: Describing one’s subjective experience in the second person [7]. 
In it she points out a great number of difficulties of becoming aware of one’s subjective 
experience (such as the dispersion of attention and the confusion between experience and 
representation, as well as the problems of retrospection and articulation) and how these 
difficulties might be overcome in with an appropriate interview technique. 
Despite the great sensitivity of the elicitation interview regarding many qualities of 
experience, it evades some of the tricky challenges of investigating experience, namely the 
question of who is actually researcher (the person conducting the interview or the one 
introspecting their own experience) and the constructive nature of the second-person process. 
An attempt at upgrading the elicitation interview method in the direction of an empirical 
phenomenology (as outlined by the three conditions mentioned above) is the method of the 
second-person in-depth phenomenological inquiry or SIPI for short (partially already 
described in [12]). Second-person here is used to “delineate the focus of the research: 
third-person (examining the experience of others), second-person (dialogical co-research) or 
first-person (examining one’s own experience).” [10; p.379]. 
SECOND-PERSON IN-DEPTH PHENOMENOLOGICAL INQUIRY (SIPI) 
The elicitation interview underlines just how hard it is to observe one’s experience and 
addresses the problems of retrospection, recognising the contours of experience and 
articulating them. But it still appears to be a case of a researcher gathering data from a 
participant. For the acquisition of phenomenological data it is vital to learn how to study 
one’s own experience [7, 13]. This is possible only if the person whose phenomenology is 
being studied is genuinely interested in their own experience. For this we propose that such 
persons themselves become co-researchers. 
METHODOLOGICAL TURN 
As Petitmengin [7] has pointed out, introspection is challenging. It amounts to nothing unless 
the observer dedicates a lot of interest, attention and dedication to the task. If a participant is 
sufficiently interested in the research question, so much so that it becomes their research 
question, in a way, they undergo the transformation from participant to co-researcher. It is at 
this point that research is considered in-depth. 
This transformation brings with itself a change in the research dynamic. It is no longer so that 
the researcher tries to wring out data from a participant. The co-researcher observes their own 
experience and shares their findings with the researcher. The researcher in turn helps the 
U. Kordeš and F. Klauser 
372 
co-researcher in this endeavour by evoking interest in the research question and opening up 
space for the co-researchers research that is introspection (cf. [8, 14]) with the techniques laid 
out by the elicitation interview [7]. In the Figures below is an oversimplified representation 
of the “classic” position (Figure 1) and the methodological turn (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 1. The “classic” position simplified. 
 
Figure 2. The methodological turn. 
PHASE STRUCTURE OF SIPI 
SIPI is carried out in two phases, sketched out in Figure 3. 
Phase one begins with a series of elicitation interviews. Here we might still be referring to a 
participant reporting (and not researching) and a researcher trying to obtain 
phenomenological data. The function of these interviews is twofold: gathering experiential 
reports on the phenomenon we are researching on the one hand, and introducing the 
participant to our research question and coordinating terminology on the other hand. This is 
done through a participatory process of refining experiential categories. It is important that 
the participant understands the research question and the goal of the study at hand, and that 
they themselves suggest the terms with which their experience is to be described (cf. [8]). 
Phase one is selective. During this process the participant is meant to familiarise themself 
with the process of studying experience (as well as its challenges and perhaps some trick on 
how to overcome them) and ask themself whether this process suits them. If they then also 
decide that the research question is of great enough interest to them that they are willing to 
personally commit to an active in-depth study of the phenomenon, they are ready to begin the 
second phase of SIPI as co-researchers. 
Phase two consists of two parts: journal-keeping and interviews. 
At this point, the co-researcher is already familiar with the research question, has an invested 
interested in it, and has already obtained some experience with introspection. It is therefore 
possible for them to begin observing their experience in everyday life. Observations relevant 
to the study are noted in a journal. This journal partly follows the structure laid out by John 
RESEARCHER      PARTICIPANT 
OBSERVATION 
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Figure 3. Phase structure of SIPI. 
Creswell [15], who suggests structuring entries into a reflective and a descriptive part. Our 
version uses the terms experiential part and situational context (a description of the situation 
in which the experience occurred). 
Interesting journal entries are then reviewed in interviews. While the interviews in phase one 
were split between researching the phenomenon and familiarising the participant with the 
research question and approach to exploring their experience, interviews in phase two focus 
primarily on the former. Here we speak of participatory research, where research and co-
researcher, through the cooperative process of dialogue in the form of a research conversation, 
revisit interesting and relevant experiences. The results of this research process are always 
co-constructions of both, the researcher and co-researcher, in a process perhaps similar to 
what De Jaegher and Di Paolo [16] call participatory sense-making. 
These co-constructions are not final, but keep evolving over the course of the study. This 
sequential analysis of acquired data constantly directs and corrects the course of the study, 
shaping new views and asking new questions regarding the studied phenomenon. Sequential 
analysis, though reduced in scope, already takes place in phase one, where finding from 
previous interviews as well as from other participants shape the researcher’s approach towards 
the studied phenomenon. But it is at its strongest in phase two, where each interview and 
therein discussed journal entries can be considered its own research sequence. Findings from 
the interview guide the co-researcher in their introspection and journal entries, while the journal 
entries form a new foundation on which researcher and co-researcher together arrive at new 
discoveries. In addition to that, findings from one co-researcher are compared with findings 
from other co-researchers, which again influence further research. Thus, the results of SIPI 
are never “a final truth, but only a point in the spiral of (interwoven) interpretations.” [17; p.22]. 
A CASE ILLUSTRATING THE APPLICATION OF SIPI  
SIPI was used in a study on the phenomenology of the enaction of belief. Enaction here refers 
to the description of F. Varela, E. Rosch and E. Thompson [18] of a middle way between 
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understanding cognition as passive reception of an external world and understanding 
cognition as projecting a world in accordance with the cognitive system’s structure. 
Interested participants were invited for at least one (and if interest holds, more) phase one 
interviews, which became more and more structured as the study progressed, eventually 
settling on a constant set of questions that allowed comparison between participants. 
Participants who, during the course of phase one, acquired a firm understanding of the 
researched phenomenon and developed a proper, deep-seated interest in studying it even 
outside the context of an interview, are invited to keep a journal, recommended the 
predetermined entry structure and thus progress to phase two as co-researchers. Now 
interviews are no longer pre-structured. They are now shaped by the co-researcher and their 
observations of their everyday experience, as noted in their journal. 
Independent of the interviews, the research group conducts regular meetings and discussions 
on the current course of the study, new findings from individual interviews and interesting 
new questions or directions of research. Here, researchers and co-researchers together 
compare their experiences, highlighting commonalities and differences, suggesting common 
terminology and explanations for observed phenomena. 
CO-CONSTRUCTING A CATEGORY 
One of the sub-questions asked in this study is: “How does the communicational situation 
affect the enaction of beliefs?” What is observed here is whether and how different situations, 
most prominently exemplified by different interlocutors, affect either which beliefs get 
enacted or the way in which those beliefs are enacted. But for that we predicted that the 
interlocutor would somehow have to be present in the person’s experience. How? For many 
co-researchers, this is very hard to observe in their own experience, especially expressed in 
terms coined by someone else. Below is an excerpt from an interview, wherein researcher and 
co-researcher try to find this phenomenon, inadvertently coining a new term for describing it. 
T01: I don’t know. How, ok how do I experience this (long pause) well... well 
if I wanted to tell you, well, this part of experience as in “do I see anything? 
Do I hear anything?” and such, I don’t remember that now. And the rest I can’t 
describe. 
R: I’ll ask like this: is there anywhere in your experience a feeling of what this 
boy thinks of you? 
T01: Not really that. Just that, he wouldn’t think badly of me. 
R: How do you know he doesn’t already? 
T01: I don’t. I think because ... I don’t ... I know from my relationship with him. 
R: Be specific. 
T01: Well, because he never said or did anything, that would make me think 
he thinks bad of me, and because I think he’s a kid and not even capable of 
thinking anything like that. 
R: Look, you developed this whole argument about this. Where – did you ever 
contemplate this? 
T01: This right now? 
R: Yes. 
T01: With this – in this situation? 
R: Yes. 
T01: No. 
R: So, but still you knew. 
T01: Yes. 
R: So this argument was just you explaining it to me. 
Second-person in-depth phenomenological inquiry as an approach for studying enaction of beliefs 
375 
T01: Yes. 
R: It is not true, that you think that because of this. 
T01: Because of what, then? 
R: I don’t know. I mean –  
T01: Well, you always know that in the background. 
R: Where, well, yes, this! This background is what we’re looking for! 
T01: Yeah, you know that! 
R: Where do you know that? 
T01: I mean, I know that. 
R: Yes, this part! […] So it’s somewhere in the background. 
T01: I mean, in the background... I mean that metaphorically. 
R: Mmm, this background sounds very real to me. Can you describe this 
background? 
T01: Yeah, I don’t know. 
R: You see, what I wanted to say was that you apparently never sat down, took 
some time, and contemplated: “aha, look, that boy never said anything bad about 
me, and he’s just a kid, and I don’t know what else. What can I deduce from 
that? Oh, that he think good of me!” You probably never looked at it like that. 
T01: No. 
R: So there was something else. What? Something in the background, some 
feeling is in the background. So you just explained it like that to me, in reality 
you didn’t argue it like this to yourself. 
T01: Yeah, a feeling, that ... a feeling ... of the relationship, that ... you 
develop over time. And at every point you have a feeling of the relationship. In 
this case, with that boy. 
R: Yes, this feeling is what we’re interested in! 
FEELING OF THE RELATIONSHIP VERSUS FEELING OF THE CONTENT 
We present one of several grounded theories that have emerged during our undertaking: the 
apparent inverse proportionality of feeling of the content and feeling of the relationship. 
Feeling of the relationship is a deductive category. Its origin goes back to the hypothesis that 
interlocutors affect the enaction of beliefs. This category refers to descriptions of 
interlocutors (or the current social situation) being in the centre of attention: “What does 
he/she think of me? What is our relationship? What is expected of me in this exchange?” One 
example of this category is already presented above, but to paint a clearer picture, we provide 
another: 
Well, from them I received, well, signals. […] if they’re paying attention or if 
they’re looking away. And if they were looking away, I’d feel stupid, or 
stupider than if they were looking at me. […] And that was like boost, a boost 
of ... feeling good talking to them. 
Feeling of the content is an inductive category. It represents descriptions of the content one is 
trying to communicate (or receive through communication from an interlocutor) being the 
centre of attention, where one focuses on what information has already been transmitted and 
what information still needs to be conveyed in order to communicate a full explanation. This 
is exemplified by the following quote: 
I knew what I have already told her and what she knows about this. And then, 
how I would connect it all and explain it. And in that feeling, when I knew 
what she knew, I tried to somehow put myself into her shoes, and try to look at 
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the whole thing as if I knew only what I told her in those last fifteen minutes, 
what I would need to add or what I would have wanted explained. 
The preliminary results of the study suggest the following: the experience of beliefs being 
enacted varies from instance to instance, and in these instances the feeling of the relationship 
or the feeling of the content plays a central role. What is most interesting is that there appears 
to be an inverse proportionality in the manifestation of these feelings, that is a person seems 
to always feel one feeling to be much stronger than the other – either focusing on the social 
situation, the interlocutors emotions and how the relationship is to progress, or on the content 
of the information being transmitted. 
DISCUSSION 
Of great concern to the presented technique is the question of validity. On one hand, the 
possibility of observing the desired phenomenon in an everyday environment with arguably 
minimal interference from a researcher allows for very high ecological validity. On the other 
hand, the selection process co-researchers is very fastidious. One of the reasons for 
implementing SIPI is to dedicate more attention to individual differences in experience. We 
think that this research technique can more clearly bring forth different ways of constructing 
a personal reality. But the problem is that the demands the technique poses to participants (a 
personal, existential interest for the investigation of their experience) disqualify certain 
groups and with that certain modalities of the construction of experience. 
SIPI’s methodological turn doubtlessly addresses at least two of the three conditions we have 
set ourselves for an empirical phenomenology. By encouraging the participant to become a 
co-researcher, the observed attains its rightful status as the observer as well. And because 
introspection is a skill that is honed by its practice, growth and change in the (co-)researcher 
is an inseparable part of the practise of studying one’s experience. 
What also remains problematic is the question of intersubjective validation. Participartory 
research is very vulnerable in the area of replication. SIPI empowers both the “original” 
researcher and the co-researcher by giving them freedom to co-construct research results. An 
upside of this process is that partial intersubjective validation can already happen during the 
interviews (which thus become more and more similar to discussions between researchers 
than the gathering of data). But this kind of research of course adds complexity and lowers 
the chances of replication. We believe that empirical phenomenological research is currently 
in the butterfly collecting stage – similar to biology in the 18
th
 century, when researchers like 
Humbolt walked the world and gathered samples. Only when enough samples were obtained 
the coordination of appropriate gathering techniques and sensible classification could begin. 
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